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1. Introduction
Up till recently past electric power systems were characterized by centralized production
units, a high voltage transmission grid for the bulk energy transmission and medium and
low voltage distribution grids to bring the energy to the consumer. Traditionally no genera-
tion sources were connected to the distribution grid, however, this has changed significantly
the past decade. Nowadays various types of small generation sources, better known as dis-
tributed generation (DG), are connected to the distribution grid. Due to CO2 reduction goals
many of the small units integrated in the distribution grid are renewable energy sources, such
as wind turbines, small scale hydro plants and photovoltaic panels but also high efficient
non-renewable energy sources, such as small Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants are
implemented.
Connection of DG not only alters the load flow in the distribution grid but can also alter the
fault current during a grid disturbance. Most distribution grid protective systems detect an
abnormal grid situation by discerning a fault current from the normal load current. Because
DG changes the grid contribution to the fault current, the operation of the protective system
can be affected. This is reported in (Deuse et al., 2007; Doyle, 2002; Kauhamieni & Kumpu-
lainen, 2004), however, in these papers the protection problems are discussed in general terms.
In this chapter a detailed analysis of possible protection problems is given. It starts with an
analytical description of fault currents in distribution grids including DG. With the aid of the
analytical equations the effect of DG on the fault current is studied and key parameters are
identified. This chapter also provides an equation to calculate the location where the DG-unit
has the most effect on the grid contribution to the fault current. During the design stage of
the protective system for a distribution feeder including DG this equation can be applied to
determine if protection problems are to be expected. The application of the derived equations
are demonstrated on a generic test feeder.
An overview of all possible protection problems is presented and a classification of the pro-
tection problems is given. Furthermore these protection problems are linked to the theoretical
background which is discussed in the beginning of the chapter. In this part of the chapter
solutions for the possible protection problems are presented as well as new developments in
protective systems which enables a further integration of DG in distribution grids.
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The chapter ends with a case study on a benchmark network which demonstrates the fault
detection problem. Dynamic simulations show how the fault detection problems arises and
what remedies can be taken to prevent these.
2. Fault currents in faulted distribution feeders including DG
The connection of DG to distribution feeders changes the fault currents in faulted feeders.
The rate of change of the fault currents strongly depends on the ability of the DG to contribute
to the fault current. DG based on an asynchronous generator does not provide a sustain-
able fault current during a grid-disturbance. The same holds mostly for inverter-connected
DG such as micro-turbines, fuel-cells and PV-systems, from which the fault current contri-
bution can be neglected (Jenkins et al., 2000; Morren & de Haan, 2008). However, in (Baran
& El-Markabi, 2004) it is demonstrated that in weak systems, during a high resistive fault,
inverter-connected DG although, change the grid contribution to the fault current. This is also
reported in (Kumpulainen et al., 2005). The reference (Baran & El-Markabi, 2005) proposes
for weak systems an extension of the conventional fault analysis method to include the effect
of inverter-connected DG. A generator type that contributes a sustainable fault current is the
synchronous generator (Jenkins et al., 2000). These type of generators can be found in small
combined heat and power plants. In this section the effect of synchronous generators on the
grid contribution to the fault current is considered.
2.1 Theoretical background
To analyse the effect of DG on the fault current in a feeder, a generic feeder is taken as a refer-
ence as shown in figure 1. At distance d a DG-unit is connected and at the end of the feeder
a three-phase fault is present. For the analysis it is convenient to use a distance parameter to
indicate the location of the DG which is relative to the total feeder length. This parameter is
defined as:
l =
d
dtot
(1)
In equation (1) d is the distance to the DG-unit and dtot is the total feeder length.
G
Ik,gen
Ik,grid
Relay
d
Fig. 1. Short-circuit current contribution of both grid and DG-unit
An electric equivalent of the feeder shown in figure 1 is given in figure 2. In this figure ZL
is the total line-impedance, Zg the generator-impedance and Zs the source-impedance. The
voltages of the grid and generator are denoted as Us and Ug.
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Zs l·ZL Zg
(1-l)·ZLUs UgI1 I2
Fig. 2. Network equivalent of figure 1
Defining the mesh currents I1 and I2 and applying the Kirchhoff Voltage Law (KVL) for Us
and Ug can be found:
[
Us
Ug
]
=
[
Zs + ZL (1− l) · ZL
(1− l) · ZL Zg + (1− l) · ZL
]
·
[
I1
I2
]
(2)
In figure 2 and equation (2) I1 is the grid contribution Ik,grid, and I2 is the DG-contribution,
Ik,gen, to the total fault current. An analytical expression for I1 and I2 can be found by solving
equation (2). Because of the strong relation with the IEC60909 fault-analysis method, in this
chapter Thevenin’s Theorem is applied on the network of figure 2 to find a analytical expres-
sion for Ik,grid and Ik,gen. In figure 3 the Thevenin equivalent of the network of figure 2 is
shown.
Zs l·ZL
Zg
(1-l)·ZL
Uth
Ik,grid
Ik,gen
Ik,3ph
Fig. 3. Thevenin equivalent of figure 1
For this figure the Thevenin impedance is:
Zth =
(Zs + l · ZL) · Zg
Zs + l · ZL + Zg
+ (1− l) · ZL (3)
In equation (3) Zs = jXs is the grid impedance, Zg = jXg is the generator impedance and
ZL = RL + jXL is the total line or cable impedance. l is the relative generator location as
defined in equation (1). The total three-phase short-circuit current can be calculated by:
Ik,3ph =
Uth√
3 · Zth
(4)
Combining equation (3) and equation (4) yields:
Ik,3ph =
Uth · (Zg + l · ZL + Zs)
√
3
[
(ZL · Zg + Zs · Zg + Zs · ZL) + l · ZL(ZL − Zs)− l2ZL2
] (5)
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For the grid contribution holds:
Ik,grid =
Zg(
Zg + l · ZL + Zs
) · Ik,3ph (6)
Substituting equation (5) in equation (6) gives for the grid contribution:
Ik,grid =
Uth · Zg
√
3
[
(ZL · Zg + Zs · Zg + Zs · ZL) + l · ZL(ZL − Zs)− l2ZL2
] (7)
The total short-circuit current, Ik,3ph, is determined by equation (5) which is a non-lineair
equation, so Ik,grid is non-lineair as well. In case of a weak grid, Zs can be as large as Zg
and due to the contribution of the generator, the grid contribution to the short-circuit current
decreases.
2.2 Simulation of a 3-bus test network
In the previous section equation (7) describes the grid contribution to the fault current in a
distribution feeder including a synchronous generator. This equation shows that the grid con-
tribution will be determined by the total feeder impedance, the local short-circuit power at
the substation, the generator size and location. To determine the impact of the synchronous
generator on the short-circuit current a 3-bus test network is defined and modeled in simula-
tion software. The test grid consists of an external grid, three MV-nodes which are connected
by two connections. At busbar 2 a synchronous generator is connected. The test network is
depicted in figure 4 and is used to illustrate the theoretical background.
Distance to substation Distance to end of feeder
1 2 3
Connection 1 Connection 2
G
Fig. 4. 3-bus network
To demonstrate the effect of the generator size and its location in the test network these two
parameters are modified. For that repetitive calculations have to be performed. The calcula-
tions are executed for a regular cable and an overhead line type from what the parameters are
shown in table 1.
Type R [Ω/km] X [Ω/km] Inom[A]
XLPE 630 mm2 Al 0.063 0.109 575
DINGO 19/.132 0.218 0.311 525
Table 1. Cable and overhead line parameters of the 3-bus test network
The length of both connections is adjusted by 10% of the total feeder length. To keep an equal
total feeder length, connection 1 is increasing and connection 2 is decreasing with the same
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step size. In this way node 2 is shifting from node 1 to node 3 and the effect of the location
of the generator can be observed. After the modification of the length of the connections a
three-phase fault calculation at busbar 3 is performed. This fault calculation is based on the
well known IEC 60909 method and per step size the grid contribution is stored. For each step
the generator size is increased with steps of 2 MWwith a maximum of 10 MW.
The result is shown in figure 5 and it can be seen clearly that the generator has an effect on
the grid contribution to the fault current. As expected, large size generators influence the grid
contribution more than small size generators.
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(a) Results for the cable case
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(b) Results for the overhead line case
Fig. 5. Simulation results for the 3-bus test network
Due to the difference in design the impedance of a cable system differs from the impedance of
overhead lines. In table 1 it can be seen that the impedance of the overhead line is larger than
the impedance of the cable. Hence the results in figure 5 show that the grid contribution to
the fault current is affected most when the generator is connected to an overhead line feeder.
2.3 Maximum generator impact
ThemaximumDG impact on the grid contribution to the short-circuit current occurs when the
grid contribution is the minimum. Hence the minimum of equation (7) has to be determined.
This is done by taken the derivative of equation (7). This leads to:
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dIk,grid
dl
= (8)
jXg
(
R2L − XL(XL − Xs)− 2l(R
2
L − X
2
L) + j(RL(2XL − Xs))
)
−Xg (XL + XsRL)− l2(R2L − X
2
L) + j
(
Xg(RL − Xs(Xg − XL)) + lRL(2XL − Xs) + 2l2RLXL
)2
The minimum of Ik,grid can be found with:
dIk,grid
dl
= 0 (9)
Which yields for l:
l =
1
2
·
R2L − XL(XL − Xs) + jRL(2XL − Xs)
(R2L − X
2
L)− 2jXLRL
(10)
With this equation the location of maximum generator impact can be calculated which can be
helpful at the planning stage.
2.4 Definitions used in distribution grid protection
The goal of a protective system is to recognize certain system abnormalities which, if unde-
tected, can lead to damage of equipment or extended loss of service (Anderson, 1999). The
protective system takes corrective actions for instance isolating a faulted component of the
system and restoring the rest of the grid to normal operating conditions. Two important as-
pects of protective systems are:
1. Reliability
2. Security
Reliability is the probability that the system will function correctly when required to act. Se-
curity is the ability of a system to refrain from unnecessary operations. The optimal protection
settings are a trade-off between reliability and security. Improving the reliability of a protec-
tion scheme by applying more sensitive settings can lead to a reduction of the security of the
protection scheme. These definitions will be applied throughout the chapter and it will be
discussed how reliability and security is influenced when DG is integrated in the distribution
grid.
3. Protection problems
Connection of small generators to distribution grids is not new at all. But in the recent past
the number of small generators has been increased rapidly and the effect on distribution grid
operation has become noticeable. Concerns have arisen if the distribution system including
distributed generation is still protected properly. In (Mäki et al., 2004) it is stated that pro-
tection issues might become one of the biggest technical barriers for wide-scale integration
of distributed generation in the Nordic distribution grids. Extensive research is done to ad-
dress possible protection problems in distribution grids including distributed generation. For
instance, in (Deuse et al., 2007; Doyle, 2002; Driesen & Belmans, 2006; Driesen et al., 2007;
Hadjsaid et al., 1999; Kauhamieni & Kumpulainen, 2004) it is discussed that the following
protection problems might appear:
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• Blinding of protection
• False tripping
• Lost of fuse-recloser coordination
• Unsynchronized reclosing
• Prohibition of automatic reclosing
These problems strongly depend on the applied protective system and consequently on the
type of distribution grid. Blinding of protection and false tripping are protection problems
which can occur in distribution grids built of cables as well as overhead lines while fuse-
recloser coordination problems and recloser problems only appear in distribution grids which
(partly) consist of overhead lines. In general the mentioned protection problems can be di-
vided into two categories:
1. Fault detection problems
2. Selectivity problems
In the next subsections all mentioned protection problems will be categorized in these two
categories and will be discussed in detail. In the description the protection problems are also
linked to the theoretical background.
3.1 Blinding of protection
As discussed and demonstrated in section 2 the grid contribution to the total fault current
will be reduced because of the contribution of distributed generation. Due to this reduction
it is possible that the short-circuit stays undetected because the grid contribution to the short-
circuit current never reaches the pickup current of the feeder relay. Overcurrent relays as
well as directional relays and reclosers rely their operation on detecting an abnormal current.
Hence, all protective systems based on these protection devices can suffer malfunctioning
because of the reduced grid contribution. This mechanism is called blinding of protection and
belongs to the first category of protection problems.
In (Chilvers et al., 2004; 2005) distance protection is applied to increase the amount of dis-
tributed generation connected to the distribution grid. Distance protection is a zone protec-
tion and the protected feeder is divided into a number of zones. The first zone covers approx-
imately 85% of the line length while zone 2 and 3 are used for the rest of the line length and
as a backup protection for subsequent distance protections. Faults in zone 2 and 3 are cleared
with a time delay in order to obtain selectivity with the subsequent distance protections. This
protection type acts more or less independent of the size of the fault current. However, due to
the reduced grid contribution the impedance calculated to the fault location will increase and
causes protection underreach. Faults normally cleared in zone 1 might then be cleared in zone
2 with subsequently a longer fault clearing time. The seriousness of this problem depends on
local short-circuit power, X/R ratio of the distribution feeder and size of the generator which
are the key parameters mentioned in section 2.
It can be concluded that distributed generation with a relevant contribution to the fault cur-
rent directly affects the sensitivity of a protective system and therefore the reliability of the
protective system.
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation 100
3.2 False tripping
False tripping, also known as sympathetic tripping, is possible when a generator which is
installed on a feeder, contributes to the fault in an adjacent feeder connected to the same
substation. The generator contribution to the fault current can exceed the pick-up level of the
overcurrent protection which can lead to a trip of the healthy feeder before the actual fault is
cleared. This mechanism can be categorized to the category of selectivity problems. In figure
6 the principle of false tripping is shown schematically.
G
Ik,gen
Ik,grid Ik,grid+Ik,gen
Relay
Relay
Fig. 6. Principle of false tripping
The generator has a major contribution to the fault current when the generator and/or the
fault are located near the substation. Especially in weak grids with long feeder length which
are protected by definite overcurrent relays false tripping can occur. In this case the settings
of the protection relays have to ensure that faults at the end of the feeder are also detected
which lead to a relatively small pick-up current. Here DG affects the security of the protective
system.
In (Kauhamieni & Kumpulainen, 2004) it is discussed that in some cases false tripping can be
prevented by finding another suitable relay setting. Practically it means that the fault clearing
time has to be increased rather than the pick-up current. Increase of the pick-up current re-
sults in a less sensitive feeder protection and probably not all faults will be cleared anymore.
Hence, the security of the protective system increases, but the reliability of the protective sys-
tem decreases. Changing the fault clearing time lead to the disconnection of the faulted feeder
first and prevent the healthy feeder from false tripping. When selectivity cannot be reached
by changing the protection settings the application of directional overcurrent protection can
solve the problem (Kumpulainen & Kauhaniemi, 2004). However, directional protection is
slower, more expensive and usually not the standard solution of grid operators.
3.3 Recloser problems
Protection of overhead distribution feeders with automatic reclosers is a very efficient way
to protect against temporary disturbances and minimize the number of supply interruptions.
Because of the coordination between the reclosers and the lateral fuses permanent faults are
cleared in a selective way. Connection of DG to these type of feeders causes several protection
problems at the same time. First of all the fault current detection by the recloser is affected
by the generator contribution and can lead to a detection problem. Secondly the coordination
between reclosers or fuse and recloser can be lost which directly causes selectivity problems.
This is explained in more detail with the feeders shown in figure 7.
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G
Ik,grid
Ik,genRec 1 Rec 2
Fault 1 Fault 2
(a) Effect of DG on recloser operation
G
Ik,grid
Ik,genRec 1 Rec 2
(b) Effect of DG on fuse-recloser coordination
Fig. 7. Radial distribution feeder including protection devices
In figure 7(a) for the fault location Fault 1 holds:
Ik,tot = Ik,grid + Ik,gen (11)
For the indicated fault location Fault 1 the short-circuit current sensed by Rec 1 is Ik,grid. As
demonstrated in section 2 the grid contribution reduces and lead to a delayed fault detection
or in the worst case to no detection at all. This is an example of a fault detection problem.
For fault location Fault 2 the short-circuit current seen by Rec 2 is Ik,tot which is larger than the
current sensed by Rec 1. Most reclosers are equipped with a dependent time-current charac-
teristic and the coordination between Rec 1 and Rec 2 still holds. Because of the connection
of the generator to the feeder the total short-circuit current is increasing and for end-of-line
faults the maximum interrupting rating of Rec 2 has to be checked.
In (Anderson, 1999) the coordination between a fuse and a recloser is explained in detail.
As shown in figure 8 the fuse and recloser are coordinated such that there is selective fault
clearing for the fault currents Ik,min < I f ault < Ik,max.
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Fig. 8. Coordination between a lateral fuse and a recloser
For the situation in figure 7(b) the coordination between the fuse and recloser is lost when
Ik,tot > Ik,max. In that case the curve of the fuse is under the curve of the recloser and the
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fuse clears the fault before the recloser operates. Hence, temporary faults will be cleared
permanently and lead to unnecessary interruptions.
Besides detection problems and lost of coordination DG also causes unsynchronized reclos-
ing. During the recloser’s dead time a part of the feeder is disconnected from the main system
to allow the arc to deionize. The connected generator tends to keep the disconnected feeder
part energized and maintains the arc at the fault-location. Hence the temporary fault becomes
permanent. Moreover, due to unbalance between load and generation the generators will drift
away from synchronism with respect to the main grid which results in a unsynchronized re-
closing action. This can seriously damage the generator and causes high currents and voltages
in neighboring grids (Kauhamieni & Kumpulainen, 2004).
4. Solutions and alternative protective systems
Installing small generation in the distribution grid has become popular since the mid eighties
and the protection problems caused by DG has been studied accordingly (Dugan et al., 1984;
Rizy et al., 1985). In the literature for the problems mentioned in the previous section a wide
pallet of solutions is offered. These solutions vary between a simple change in relay settings to
a complete new adaptive protective system. In this section an overview of possible solutions
is given.
4.1 Prevention of detection and selectivity problems
Fault detection problems do have a relation with the amount of generation connected to the
distribution grid and the local short-circuit power. To prevent fault detection problems a first
attempt is to modify the relay settings of the relays and reclosers (Baran & El-Markabi, 2004;
Hadjsaid et al., 1999; Kumpulainen et al., 2005; Mäki et al., 2004). The generator contribution
leads to a reduction of the grid contribution to the fault current hence the pick-up current of
the relays has to be reduced. However, fault detection problems might be solved by reducing
the pick-up current, the sensitivity and security of the protective system is decreased and
might lead to false tripping in case of a fault in an adjacent feeder. In (Mäki et al., 2004) an
example of a weak network is given where blinding of protection occurs due to the connection
of a small wind farm. By reducing the pick-up current blinding of protection is solved but at
the same time it introduces for faults in a certain area false tripping. A proposed solution is to
install protection devices with an additional time delay to give the feeder including the wind
farm a longer fault clearing time. These type of solutions also discussed in (Deuse et al., 2007).
Another example of changed protection settings is discussed in (Baran & El-Markabi, 2004).
Here an adaptive overcurrent relay is proposed which decreases the pick-up current as the
output of the local generation increases. This is also studied in (Vermeyen, 2008) where it is
stated that a continuous adaptation of the pick-up current as function of the generator output
results in less superfluous disconnection of the feeder.
4.2 Mitigation of recloser problems
Fault detection problems also occur in distribution feeders with overhead lines including DG,
which are protected by reclosers. As a result fuse-recloser coordination can be lost. In (Brahma
&Girgis, 2002) modern microprocessor-based reclosers are applied to restore the coordination
between the fuse and recloser. In the microprocessor several trip curves can be programmed
and the microprocessor keeps track which curve is in use. As explained in figure 8 the recloser
is equipped with a fast and a slow curve. In the microprocessor the fast curve should be
programmed in such a way that this curve is selective with the lateral fuses, especially in
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presence of DG. To prevent unsynchronized reclosing, DG has to be disconnected as soon as
possible which brings the grid back in the situation without DG. Hence, the fast curve has to
be active only during the first reclosing action. In the second reclosing cycle, the slow curve is
active which is selective with the lateral fuses and the fault can be cleared in a selective way.
A different approach to solve the fuse-recloser problem is to limit the infeed of the DG. There-
fore for laterals where DG is connected onto, the protective scheme is modified by replacing
the lateral fuse for a high speed recloser (Funmilayo & Butter-Purry, 2009). The reclosers are
coordinated in such a way that the lateral recloser operates before the recloser in the main
feeder. Furthermore at the coupling point the DG-unit is equipped with an overcurrent relay.
The modifications are shown in figure 9.
G
Ik,grid
Ik,gen
Rec 1 Rec 2Rec 3
Rel 1
Fault 2
Fault 1
Fig. 9. Modified protective scheme for a radial feeder protected by a recloser
For fault location Fault 1 the recloser Rec 1 operates on the fast curve and clears the fault. The
lateral recloser Rec 3 also operate at his fast curve and limits the infeed of the DG-unit. Both
reclosers are high-speed reclosers and the main feeder as well as the lateral are reconnected
after a short time period. When it concerns a temporary fault the feeder can stay in operation.
For a permanent fault, after the reclosing action of both reclosers, the overcurrent relay Rel 1 of
the DG-unit disconnects the DG-unit. This occurs before the delayed operation of recloser Rec
1. Since the DG-unit is removed from the system, the fault clearing can proceed as it normally
does for distribution grids without DG. For fault location Fault 2 a lateral recloser Rec 3 and
the main feeder recloser Rec 1 clear the fault. In case of a permanent fault the reclosing action
of both reclosers will again lead to a fault current which will blow the fuse. Now the fault
is removed and the feeder can stay in operation. When the fuse fails to clear the fault the
overcurrent relay Rel 1 will disconnect the DG-units and the recloser at the main feeder will
lock-out after one or two delayed reclosing attempts.
The idea of the previous solution is to limit the DG infeed and restore the radial nature of the
distribution grid. The most effective way solving all protection problems is a fast disconnec-
tion of all involved DG during a disturbance. In some connection standards, e.g. (IEEE1547,
July, 2003), this is even obliged. As discussed in (Tailor & Osman, 2008) the disconnection of
the DG-units has to take place before the fuses or reclosers can operate. For this purpose a
regular circuit breaker is relatively slow and it is proposed to replace the mechanical circuit
breaker by a semiconductor switch. The semiconductor switch contains two anti-parallel con-
nected Gate Turn Off (GTO) thyristors and a current sensing unit with a microprocessor. The
current sensing unit is set with a preset value and monitors continuously the DG phase cur-
rents. If the threshold is exceeded it indicates that a fault has occurred and the current sensing
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation 104
unit is sending blocking signals to the GTOs. Within a few milliseconds the DG-units are re-
moved from the distribution grid and the radial nature is restored before a fuse or recloser has
operated.
4.3 Strategies for solving unsynchronized reclosing and islanding
The most challenging protection problem is unsynchronized reclosing and islanding. Unsyn-
chronized reclosing only occurs in distribution grids protected by reclosers while islanding
can occur in grids with a conventional overcurrent protection as well. Unsynchronized re-
closing is already discussed in section 3.3. The islanding problem has a strong relation with
unsynchronized reclosing. During the reclosers dead-time, a DG-unit can be still connected
to the isolated part of the feeder. The DG-unit tends to feed the local connected load and the
isolated part can be considered in island operation. In case of a large unbalance between load
and generation the speed of the generator will in- or decrease and the voltage and frequency
will exceed the allowable tolerances mentioned in the standards. Because of the violation of
these tolerances the DG-unit will be disconnected by its own voltage or frequency protection.
This action should take place before the reclosing action to prevent unsynchronized reclosing.
The most effective solution to prevent islanding and subsequently unsynchronized reclosing
is the disconnection of the DG-unit before the reclosing action takes place. The challenge in
here is to detect the formed island fast enough. Island detection methods can be divided into
three categories (Abarrategui et al., 2007; Mahat et al., 2008):
1. Passive methods
2. Active methods
3. Traditional methods or remote techniques
The passive methods make use that when an island is formed some important parameters,
such as voltage, current, frequency and harmonic distortion, changes. Monitoring the change
of these parameters can lead to a detection of an island. The difficulty of these methods is
defining suitable threshold values to differentiate islanding from other disturbances. An ex-
ample of a popular passive islanding protection is the rate of change of frequency (ROCOF).
For systems with a load or generation surplus the ROCOF protection works well. However,
in a perfect match of generation and load the rate of change of frequency is small and island
detection will be quite cumbersome.
Active islanding detection methods intentional create a small disturbance in the systemwhich
results in a significant change in system parameters in an islanded situation. In case the feeder
is connected to the main grid the effect of these small disturbances are hardly noticeable.
An example of a intentional disturbance is an introduction of a voltage fluctuation applied
through a small change of the AVR of the DG-unit. For an islanded feeder the effect of the
AVR is much larger than for feeders which are connected to the main system. The active
methods are able to detect an island even when the load matches still the generation however,
setting up an intentional disturbance needs some time and therefore these methods are slower
than the passive methods.
Traditional methods or remote techniques are based on communication between the utility
and the DG-unit. In the substation the position of the circuit breakers which can cause the is-
land are monitored and when one or more of these circuit breakers opens a transfer trip signal
is sent to the DG-unit. For the monitoring system a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
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(SCADA) system can be used. For the transmission of the trip signal a dedicated commu-
nication channel has to be present which is often expensive to implement and hence uneco-
nomical. The investment in communication channels can be prevented by using power-line
carrier (PLC) communication (Benato et al., 2003; Ropp et al., 2000). This islanding detection
system uses a ripple control signal which is superimposed on the medium voltage. The signal
is detected via a sensor which is located at the DG-site. Opening the circuit breaker not only
interrupts the load current but also the ripple control signal. The loss of the signal is sensed
by the sensor and subsequently the DG-unit is disconnected. In (Kumpulainen et al., 2005) the
PLC transfer trip method is considered reliable and selective. However, further studies as well
as field tests are needed to verify the feasibility of the method. Efficient and reliable islanding
protection methods are necessary to remove barriers which nowadays limits the integration
of DG in distribution grids.
4.4 Developments in protective systems
As discussed in the previous sections integrating DG in distribution grids can lead to serious
protection problems. Now the tendency is, in case of a grid disturbance, to disconnect the DG
as soon as possible in order to restore the original nature of the distribution grid. Restoring the
original nature of distribution grids results in a unidirectional fault current and the traditional
protective system has proven its capability to clear the fault in a selective way. For remote
faults disconnection of DG is, however, not always necessary and a waste of useable energy.
Recent developments in protective systems are focused on adaptive protection schemes which
can distinguish grid disturbances in distribution grids including DG. The papers written on
these developments are numerous and some interesting and promising results are reported
in (Brahma & Girgis, 2004; Perera & Rajapakse, 2006; Perera et al., October 2008). Traditional
protective systems make use of locally measured quantities and react if one of these quantities
is violating a certain threshold while new adaptive protective systems rely on information
obtained by specific measurement systems. The protective strategy divides the distribution
grid of a certain area into zones rather than protecting a single component or feeder. An
example of this strategy is given in (Brahma & Girgis, 2004) where the distribution grid is
split into zones which are able to run in island operation. The protective system is based
on a centralized computer wherein the grid topology is programmed. Via communication
channels all actual breaker positions are known. The computer executes off-line load flow
and short-circuit current calculations and stores the results in a database. Topology changes
due to switching actions will update the tables in the database. The central computer uses
synchronized current vector measurements at the main source, distributed generators and
breakers. In case of a fault these measurements are compared with the values in the database
to identify the faulted section or zone. A trip signal is sent to the breakers which interconnect
the various zones and the faulted zone is isolated. The remaining zones return to normal
operation and in the faulted zone the fault is cleared. A drawback of this system is its heavy
dependence on a centralized processing system and the communication links between the
zones.
In (Perera & Rajapakse, 2006; Perera et al., October 2008) an agent-based protective system
is discussed which overcomes the drawback of the previous system. This protective system
also splits up the distribution grid into zones and exchanges data for these zones via com-
munication links. The agents are located at strategic locations and make use of local current
measurements. Via a wavelet transformation the current signal is processed and the fault di-
rection is determined. All agents are equipped with a fault locating algorithm and with the
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aid of the data exchange between the agents and the fault locating algorithm the faulted zone
is cleared. It is demonstrated that this protective system also works for high impedance faults
and for distribution grids including DG.
Adding communication links to existing distribution grids is costly and hardly justified in
comparison with the benefits of improving the availability of DG. However, the need for more
data for accurate grid operation, smart metering and introduction of micro grids and virtual
power plants, also asks for communication links. The installation of communication channels
can become attractive when these links are shared by these processes. In this way new de-
velopments become possible which are hardly feasible when each individual development is
justified by its own.
5. Case study on a benchmark network
In this section the fault detection and selectivity problems are evaluated with the aid of a
generic benchmark network. First, the fault detection problem is studied with static calcula-
tions while the effect of the generator dynamics on the performance of the protective system
is examined with dynamic simulations. In the case study it will be demonstrated how the
protective system can be modified to mitigate and prevent fault detection problems.
5.1 Test system topology
In (Strunz, 2009) benchmark systems for network integration of distributed generation includ-
ing all grid parameters and a reference load flow are provided. A distinction is made between
benchmark networks which are common in North America and benchmark networks which
are typical for Europe. In this chapter the European medium voltage benchmark network is
used for which the single line diagram is depicted in figure 10. All network data is given in
(Strunz, 2009). The topology of the benchmark network consists of the feeder systems Feeder
1 and Feeder 2 which are indicated in the dashed boxes. Both feeders are operated at 10 kV
and are fed via separate transformers from the 110 kV transmission system. The configuration
of the network can be modified by means of the switches S1, S2 and S3. Via these coupling
switches radial, ring and meshed operation of the benchmark network is possible.
5.2 Fault detection problems
The theory of fault currents in faulted distribution feeders including DG is discussed in section
2. In this case study the effect of DG on the fault currents of Feeder 2 of the benchmark network
is examined to determine if fault detection problems appear. On Feeder 2 the same approach
as in section 2.2 is applied to illustrate what effect the connection of a synchronous generator
has on the grid contribution to the short-circuit current. This is done for different generator
sizes in the range of 2-10MVA. Via repetitive calculations the size and location of the generator
is varied. For Feeder 2 the grid contribution as function of the generator size and location is
given in figure 11.
The shape of the curves in figure 11 shows a great similarity with the curves in figure 5. The
minima of these curves indicate the location of the largest generator impact. With the aid of
the parameters of Feeder 2 and knowing the grid impedance this location can be calculated
with equation (10). The local fault level of Node 12 is 180 MVAwhich corresponds with a grid
impedance of j0, 551 Ω. The electric parameters of Feeder 2 are given in table 2.
According to table 2 the total feeder impedance ZL, is 5, 04 + j3, 57 Ω. With the aid of the
grid and feeder impedance and equation (10) the relative worst case generator location can be
obtained. The relative worst case generator location l, is calculated as 0,43. The total feeder
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Fig. 11. Grid contribution as function of generator size and location
length dtot is 9,88 km and with equation (1) the worst case generator location is 4,42 km which
corresponds with the minima shown in figure 11.
Normally for benchmark networks the data of the protective system is not provided. Feeder
2 of the benchmark network is supposed here to be protected with a definite overcurrent pro-
tection which is located in Node 12. In (Anderson, 1999) general setting rules for overcurrent
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Line R [Ω/km] X [Ω/km] dLine [km] Ztot [Ω] Inom [A]
Line 12-13 0,51 0,361 4,89 2, 49+ j1, 77 500
Line 13-14 0,51 0,361 2,99 1, 52+ j1, 08 500
Line 14-8 0,51 0,361 2 1, 02+ j0, 72 500
Table 2. Line parameters of Feeder 2 of the benchmark network
protection are proposed. For instance, for the pick-up current Im an approach of Im = 2 · Inom
is proposed. Applying these rules on Feeder 2 do not lead to satisfactory relay settings. Due to
the relative high feeder impedance the fault currents are such that 2 · Inom will not be reached.
Therefore the pick-up current of the protection is set to 1, 3 · Inom with a reaction time of 0,3 s.
The pick-up current of the protection and the nominal feeder current is projected in figure
11. This figure indicates that for generators larger than 4 MVA the grid contribution declines
under the pick-up current and causes blinding of protection. Strictly speaking generators
larger than 4 MVA cannot be connected to Feeder 2 for locations where the grid contribution
is smaller than the pick-up current. Connection of this size of generators is only possible when
the protective system is modified and it is guaranteed that all possible faults can be detected.
In (Deuse et al., 2007; Mäki et al., 2004) reduction of the pick-up current is proposed which
makes the protective system more sensitive. For Feeder 2 reduction of the pick-up current
reduces the reliability of the protection because the pick-up current approximates the nominal
feeder current. In that case small switching transients can cause unwanted disconnection of
the feeder.
For a more detailed analysis of the effect of DG on the protective system of Feeder 2, the
DG-location is set at the worst case generator location. This is indicated in figure 10 with the
parameter d. For a fixed DG-location the zone wherein fault detection problems occur, can
be determined by calculating the grid contribution for all fault locations along Feeder 2. Per
line segment for various fault locations a three-phase short-circuit calculation is performed.
The fault location is adjusted with 1% of the length of the line segment. The results of these
calculations are, including the pick-up current of the protection, depicted in figures 12(a) and
12(b). For a generator of 6 MVA the non-detection zone starts for faults at a distance dFault >
9 km while for a 10 MVA generator this zone already starts at dFault > 8 km. In figure 12(b) it
can be seen that for the mentioned zones the fault current will not be detected.
5.3 Dynamic simulations of fault detection problems
The calculations carried out so far do not incorporate the dynamics of the synchronous gener-
ator. As discussed in many textbooks (Grainger & Stevenson, 1994; Kundur, 1993; Machowski
et al., 2008) the synchronous generator injects a time-varying short-circuit current which re-
sults in a time-varying grid contribution as well. Via dynamic simulations Feeder 2 is exam-
ined to determine how the protective system copes with the time-varying grid contribution.
Therefore a three-phase fault at the end of Feeder 2 is simulated for generator sizes in the
range of 2-10 MVA. The resulting grid contributions are given in figure 13.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the simulations is that the fault stays undetected
when the generator size is larger than 8 MVA. During the complete simulation period the grid
contribution stays below the pick-up current of the overcurrent protection. The dynamic effect
of the generator manifests itself in the increasing grid contribution to the fault current. This
is mainly caused by the decaying DC-component in the generator contribution to the fault
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Fig. 12. Grid contribution as function of the fault location in Feeder 2
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Fig. 13. Dynamic simulation of a three-phase fault at the end of Feeder 2 for various generator
sizes
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current. Initially the overcurrent protection is not triggered but after the DC-component is
sufficiently damped for generator sizes smaller than 6 MVA the pick-up current is exceeded
and the fault is cleared. However, for the case a 6 MVA generator is connected, the fault
clearing is delayed with approximately 250 ms. This can cause serious coordination problems
with upstream protective systems. A detailed look at the results in figure 13 shows that even
connecting a 4 MVA generator leads to a delayed fault clearing.
Because of selectivity reasons and possible extra equipment damage, delayed fault clearing
is unacceptable. Making in such situations the integration of DG possible then the protection
settings or protective system has to be modified. The relatively weak feeder does not allow a
reduction of the pick-up current of the overcurrent protection without the risk of unnecessary
tripping of a healthy feeder.
The protection which has not been taken into account so far is the interconnect protection of
the DG-unit itself. This type of protective system can affect the operation of the grid protec-
tion. Examples of interconnect protection relays are under- and overvoltage and under- and
overfrequency protection. Interconnect protection differs from generator protection. The goal
of generator protection is to protect the generator against internal short-circuits and abnormal
operating conditions. These protection devices are connected at the terminals of the generator
while the interconnect protection is connected at the point of common coupling (PCC).The
major functions of an interconnect protection are (Mozina, 2006):
1. Disconnection of DG when it is no longer operating in parallel with the distribution
grid
2. Protection of the grid system from damage caused by the connection of DG
3. Protection of the generator from damage from the grid system (e.g. auto reclosing)
The simulation model used in this section is extended with an interconnect protection of the
DG-unit. The generator is equipped with a voltage transformer which measures the voltage
of the PCC and an undervoltage protection. The settings of the undervoltage protection are a
pick-up value of 0.8 p.u. and a clearing time of 200 ms. The pick-up time of the undervoltage
protection is set at 20 ms. With the interconnect protection model the dynamic simulations
are repeated to determine if the interconnect protection has a positive contribution to the fault
detection problems. The results of the simulations are depicted in figure 14(a) and 14(b).
In figure 14(a) for generator sizes up to 6 MVA it can be seen that after 200 ms the generator
is switched off by the undervoltage protection. After disconnecting the generator the grid
contribution increases directly. For the generator sizes of 2 and 4 MVA the overcurrent pro-
tection was already triggered hence the fault-clearing time does not differ with the previous
results. The disconnection of the 6 MVA generator results in an increase of the grid contribu-
tion in such a way that the pick-up current of the overcurrent relay is exceeded and the fault
is cleared. However, the total fault clearing time is still approximately 550 ms. For these cases
the undervoltage protection of the generator does not speed up the fault-clearing time of the
protective system. For the generator sizes of 8 and 10 MVA the results significantly differ. In
the previous simulations blinding of protection occurred and the overcurrent protection did
not clear the fault. The addition of the undervoltage protection leads to the disconnection
of the generator with the result that the overcurrent protection is triggered and the fault is
cleared. However, the fault-clearing time is respectively 570 and 650 ms. These results can be
explained in more detail with the aid of figure 14(b) where for all simulated generator sizes
the voltage at the PCC is given. At the moment the fault occurs the voltage along the feeder
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Fig. 14. Dynamic simulation of a three-phase fault for various generator sizes including un-
dervoltage protection
drops. In all simulations the generater tends to keep up the voltage at the PCC. For large gen-
erators this effect is stronger than for small generators. As discussed earlier the contribution of
the generator consist of a decaying DC-component. Because of this declining DC-component
the voltage at the PCC starts to drop as well, as can be seen in figure 14(b). For the cases
till 6 MVA the voltage at the PCC drops below the pick-up value of the undervoltage protec-
tion immediately after the fault is applied. The 8 and 10 MVA generator keep up the voltage
above the pick-up level of the undervoltage protection hence the undervoltage protection is
not triggered. At a certain moment the voltage at the PCC exceeds the pick-up value of the un-
dervoltage protection and the generator is disconnected from the feeder. This results directly
in an increase of the grid contribution which triggers the overcurrent protection and removes
the fault from the feeder. It can be concluded that the addition of the interconnect protection
leads to fault clearing for all simulated cases. However, for larger generator sizes the fault
clearing time is unacceptable.
To reduce the fault-clearing time the protective system has to be modified. The main goal of
this modification is a guaranteed fault detection and a reduction of fault-clearing time. Gen-
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erally, integration of a generator in a distribution grid increases the total fault current which
can be used to improve the performance of the protective system. For faults after the PCC
of the generator an overcurrent protection would sense the sum of the grid and generator
contribution while the first upstream protection device before the PCC only senses the grid
contribution. The difference in sensed fault currents can be used for coordinating the pro-
tection devices and reducing the fault-clearing time (Jäger et al., 2004; Keil & Jäger, January
2008). Therefore in Node 13 an overcurrent protection is modeled and coordinated with the
overcurrent protection of Node 12. In figure 15 an overview of the location of all protection
devices of Feeder 2 of the benchmark network is given.
G
Rel 1
12 13 14 8
d
Rel 2
Rel 3
Rel 1: I>
Rel 2: U<
Rel 3: I>
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Fig. 15. Overview of all protection devices of Feeder 2
The protection devices Rel 1 and Rel 3 are coordinated such that faults between Node 13 and
Node 8 are cleared by Rel 3 and faults between Node 12 and Node 13 by Rel 1. Protection
device Rel 1 also serves as a backup protection for faults between Node 13 and Node 8 which
are, for whatever reasons, not cleared by Rel 3. The relay settings are determined without the
generator contribution. Hence the feeder protection operation is independent of the presence
of the generator. In figure 18 the coordination of Rel 1 and Rel 3 is shown. In this case study a
time grading of 200 ms is used.
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Fig. 16. Protection coordination graph of Feeder 2
The modified protection scheme is tested for three fault locations as indicated in figure 15.
Fault location Fault 1 is located at the end of Feeder 2 to check if Rel 3 can detect the fault
current. Fault location Fault 2 is near to Node 13 to determine selective fault clearing between
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Rel 1 and Rel 3. The third fault location Fault 3 is chosen just before Node 13 to study if the
grid contribution to the fault current is large enough to trigger Rel 1. For these fault locations
similar dynamic simulations as in the previous situations are preformed. The results of the
first fault location are depicted in figure 17. In this figure the sensed fault currents by Rel 1
and 3 are given. It can be seen that for all generator sizes relay Rel 3 clears the fault in 100 ms.
Relay Rel 1 does not react on the grid contribution to the fault current and the generator stays
connected to the network. After fault-clearing the current swing sensed by Rel 1, as shown in
17(a) is caused by the dynamics of the generator.
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(a) Fault current at location Rel 1 for fault location 1
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(b) Fault current at location Rel 3 for fault location 1
Fig. 17. Fault currents at relay location Rel 1 and Rel 3 for fault location 1
For fault location Fault 2 the simulations indicate that this fault is also cleared in 100 ms by
Rel 3. This is given in figure 18. The grid contribution is such that Rel 1 is triggered as well
but the fault is cleared in a selective way. Because the fault is cleared in 100 ms the generator
stays connected to the grid.
The results for the third fault location differ from the previous results. The clearing time of
relay Rel 1 is set to 300 ms hence during the fault the generator is disconnected by the under-
voltage protection. This can be seen in figure 19 which shows the results of the simulation of
this fault location. In the first 200 ms of the fault the grid contribution is sufficient to trigger
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Fig. 18. Fault currents at relay location Rel 1 and Rel 3 for fault location 2
the overcurrent protection. For all generator sizes the generator is disconnected after 200 ms
which causes a sudden increase in the grid contribution to the fault current. However, the
overcurrent protection was triggered already and the fault is cleared after 300 ms.
It can be concluded that the addition of relay Rel 3 has resulted in a faster fault clearing for
faults between Node 13 and Node 8 without disconnection of the generator. It is demon-
strated that Feeder 2 is protected in a selective way. Faults between Node 12 and Node 13
are switched-off in 300 ms for all generator sizes. In comparison with the previous results the
modification of the protective system has lead to a reduction in fault clearing time of 350 ms.
Simulations have shown that all faults are cleared within 300 ms.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter the effect of distributed generation on the protection of distribution grids was
treated. It was demonstrated that DG-units with a synchronous generator can have a strong
influence on the grid contribution to the fault current. Analytical expressions were derived to
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Fig. 19. Fault current at location Rel 1 for fault location 3
determine the key parameters which influence the grid contribution to the fault current. Im-
portant parameters which determine the effect of the generator on the grid contribution to the
fault current are the total feeder impedance, the size and the location of the generator. Besides
that, the local short-circuit power is also of importance. In a simulation of a 3-bus network
it was shown that the generator has more effect on the grid contribution to the fault current
for feeders consisting of overhead lines than for the same type of feeder built up of cables.
This effect is caused by the fact that overhead lines have a significant larger impedance than
an equivalent cable. Based on the results of the 3-bus network and the analytical description
of the grid contribution to the fault current an equation was derived which can be used to
calculate the worst-case generator location.
Then, an overview of all possible protection problems was given and categorized into fault
detection and selectivity problems. This categorization shows that apparent different protec-
tion problems, such as blinding of protection and lost of fuse-recloser coordination, are related
to each other. It was pointed out that solving the fault detection problem directly influence
the reliability of a protective system while solving selectivity problems affect the security of a
protective system. For both types of protection failure various solutions were discussed and
an overview of new developments in protective systems to prevent these protection problems
has been given.
The fault detection problem was demonstrated with a generic test feeder. The derived equa-
tions were applied on the test feeder to calculate the worst-case generator location. Stationary
simulations were carried out for generator sizes of 2-10 MVA and showed that fault detec-
tion problems are expected for generator sizes > 4 MVA. Dynamic simulations gave a more
accurate results and it could be concluded that for generator sizes of 8-10 MVA serious fault
detection problems may occur while for generator sizes of 2-6 MVA a delayed fault clearing
takes place. The different result can be explained by noticing that in the dynamic simulation
the DC-component in the fault current of the generator is damped. Because of the declining
generator contribution the grid contribution increases and triggers the overcurrent protection.
Normally the DG-units are equipped with an undervoltage protection and with that the series
of simulations were repeated. It resulted in guaranteed fault clearing for all generator sizes,
however, for some sizes the fault clearing was still delayed. Hence, to improve the perfor-
mance of the protective system it has to be modified. A simple modification is the addition
of a protection device after the PCC of the generator which has to be coordinated with the
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upstream protection device. This modified protective system was simulated and resulted for
all generator sizes in a guaranteed and selective fault clearing.
In general the case study showed that dynamic simulations are necessary to evaluate the per-
formance of a protective system of a feeder including DG.
7. References
Abarrategui, O., Zamora, I. & Larruskain, D. (2007). Comparative analysis of islanding detec-
tion methods in networks with DG, CIRED 19th International conference on Electricity
Distribution, May 21-24, Vienna.
Anderson, P. (1999). Power System Protection, IEEE Press power engineering series, McGraw-
Hill, New York.
Baran, M. & El-Markabi, I. (2004). Adaptive overcurrent protection for distribution feeder with
distributed generation, october 10-13, new york ny, IEEE Power Systems Conference and
Exposition, Vol. 2, pp. 715–719.
Baran, M. & El-Markabi, I. (2005). Fault analysis on distribution feeders with distributed
generation, IEEE transactions on power systems, Vol. 20, pp. 1757–1764.
Benato, R., Caldon, R. &Cesena, F. (2003). Carrier signal-based protection to prevent dispersed
generation islanding on mv systems, CIRED 17th International conference on Electricity
Distribution, May 12-15, Barcelona.
Brahma, S. & Girgis, A. (2002). Microprocessor-based reclosing to coordinate fuse and recloser
in a system with high penetration of distributed generation, IEEE Power Engineering
Society Winter Meeting, New York NY, pp. 453–458.
Brahma, S. & Girgis, A. (2004). Development of adaptive protection scheme for distribution
systems with high penetration of distributed generation, IEEE Transactions On Power
Delivery, Vol. 19, pp. 56–63.
Chilvers, I., Jenkins, N. & Crossley, P. (2004). The use of 11 kV distance protection to increase
generation connected to the distribution network, Eight IEE international conference on
developments in power system protection, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Chilvers, I., Jenkins, N. & Crossley, P. (2005). Distance relaying of 11 kV circuits to increase the
installed capacity of distributed generation, IEE Proceedings Generation, Transmission
and distribution, Vol. 152, pp. 40–46.
Deuse, J., Grenard, S., Bollen, M., Häger, M. & Sollerkvist, F. (2007). Effective impact of der
on distribution system protection, CIRED 19th International conference on Electricity
Distribution, May 21-24, Vienna.
Doyle, M. (2002). Reviewing the impact of distributed generation on distribution system pro-
tection, IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Chicago IL.
Driesen, J. & Belmans, R. (2006). Distributed Generation: Challenges and possible solutions,
IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Tampa FL.
Driesen, J., Vermeyen, P. & Belmans, R. (2007). Protection issues in microgrids with multiple
distributed generation units, Power Conversion Conference PCC’07, Nagoya.
Dugan, R., Thomas, S. & Rizy, D. (1984). Integrating dispersed storage and generation with an
automated distribution system, IEEE transactions on power apparatus and systems, Vol.
PAS 103, pp. 1142–1146.
Funmilayo, H. & Butter-Purry, K. (2009). An approach to mitigate the impact of distributed
generation on the overcurrent protection scheme for radial feeders, IEEE Power Sys-
tems Conference and Exposition,Seattle WA, pp. 1–11.
Grainger, J. & Stevenson, W. (1994). Power System Analysis, McGraw Hill Inc.
www.intechopen.com
Effect of DG on distribution grid protection 117
Hadjsaid, N., Canard, J.-F. & Dumas, F. (1999). Dispersed generation impact on distribution
networks, Computer applications in power, Vol. 12, pp. 22–28.
IEEE1547, S. (July, 2003). IEEE 1547 standard for interconnecting distributed resources with
electrical power systems, IEEE.
Jäger, J., Keil, T., L.Shang & Krebs, R. (2004). New protection co-ordination methods in the
presence of distributed generation, Eight IEE international conference on developments
in power system protection, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pp. 319–322.
Jenkins, N., Allen, R., Crossley, P., Kirschen, D. & Strbac, G. (2000). Embedded Generation, Series
31, 2nd edn, IEE Power & Energy, London.
Kauhamieni, K. & Kumpulainen, L. (2004). Impact of distributed generation on the protection
of distribution networks, Eight IEE international conference on developments in power
system protection, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Vol. 1, pp. 315–318.
Keil, T. & Jäger, J. (January 2008). Advanced coordination method for overcurrent protection
relays using nonstandard tripping characteristics, IEEE transactions on power delivery,
Vol. 23, pp. 52–57.
Kumpulainen, L. & Kauhaniemi, K. (2004). Analysis of the impact of distributed generation
on automatic reclosing, IEEE Power Systems Conference and Exposition, October 10-13,
New York NY, Vol. 1, pp. 603–608.
Kumpulainen, L., Kauhaniemi, K., Verho, P. & Vähämäki, O. (2005). New requirements for
system protection caused by distributed generation, CIRED 18th International Confer-
ence on Electricity Distribution, June 6-9, Turin.
Kundur, P. (1993). Power system Stability and Control, McGraw Hill Inc., New York, USA.
Machowski, J., Bialek, J. & Bumby, J. (2008). Power System Dynamics, Stability and Control, 2nd
edn, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, United Kingdom.
Mahat, P., Chen, Z. & Bak-Jensen, B. (2008). Review of islanding detection methods for dis-
tributed generation, Third international conference on Electric Utility Deregulation Re-
structuring and Power Technologies (DRPT2008), April 2008, Nanjing, China, pp. 2743–
2748.
Mäki, K., Repo, S. & Järventausta, P. (2004). Effect of wind power based distributed generation
on protection of distribution networks, Eight IEE international conference on develop-
ments in power system protection, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Vol. 1, pp. 327–330.
Morren, J. & de Haan, S. (2008). Impact of distributed generation units with power electronic
converters on distribution network protection, Ninth IET international conference on
developments in power system protection, Glasgow, Scotland.
Mozina, C. (2006). Distributed generator interconnect protection practices, IEEE Power Engi-
neering Society Power System Conference and Exposition, Dallas TX, pp. 1164–1170.
Perera, N. & Rajapakse, A. (2006). Agent-based protection shceme for distribution networks
with distributed generation, IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Montreal,
QC, Canada.
Perera, N., Rajapakse, A. & Buchholzer, T. (October 2008). Isolation of faults in distribu-
tion networks with distributed generators, IEEE transactions on power delivery, Vol. 23,
pp. 2347–2355.
Rizy, D., Jewell, W. & Stovall, J. (1985). Operational and design considerations for electric dis-
tribution systems with dispersed storage and generation, IEEE transactions on power
apparatus and systems, Vol. PAS 104, pp. 2864–2871.
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation 118
Ropp, M., Aaker, K., Haigh, J. & Sabbah, N. (2000). Using power line carrier communication
to prevent islanding, Twenty-eight IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference, Anchorage,
AK, pp. 1675–1678.
Strunz, K. (2009). Benchmark systems for network integration of renewable and distributed
energy resources, Preliminary version, Cigre Task Force C6.04.02, July 2009.
Tailor, J. & Osman, A. (2008). Restoration of fuse-recloser coordination in distribution system
with high dg penetration, IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Pittsburg
PA.
Vermeyen, P. (2008). Effect of distributed generation on fault detection and ripple control, Ph.D
Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation
Edited by D N Gaonkar
ISBN 978-953-307-046-9
Hard cover, 406 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 01, February, 2010
Published in print edition February, 2010
In the recent years the electrical power utilities have undergone rapid restructuring process worldwide. Indeed,
with deregulation, advancement in technologies and concern about the environmental impacts, competition is
particularly fostered in the generation side, thus allowing increased interconnection of generating units to the
utility networks. These generating sources are called distributed generators (DG) and defined as the plant
which is directly connected to distribution network and is not centrally planned and dispatched. These are also
called embedded or dispersed generation units. The rating of the DG systems can vary between few kW to as
high as 100 MW. Various new types of distributed generator systems, such as microturbines and fuel cells in
addition to the more traditional solar and wind power are creating significant new opportunities for the
integration of diverse DG systems to the utility. Interconnection of these generators will offer a number of
benefits such as improved reliability, power quality, efficiency, alleviation of system constraints along with the
environmental benefits. Unlike centralized power plants, the DG units are directly connected to the distribution
system; most often at the customer end. The existing distribution networks are designed and operated in radial
configuration with unidirectional power flow from centralized generating station to customers. The increase in
interconnection of DG to utility networks can lead to reverse power flow violating fundamental assumption in
their design. This creates complexity in operation and control of existing distribution networks and offers many
technical challenges for successful introduction of DG systems. Some of the technical issues are islanding of
DG, voltage regulation, protection and stability of the network. Some of the solutions to these problems include
designing standard interface control for individual DG systems by taking care of their diverse characteristics,
finding new ways to/or install and control these DG systems and finding new design for distribution system. DG
has much potential to improve distribution system performance. The use of DG strongly contributes to a clean,
reliable and cost effective energy for future. This book deals with several aspects of the DG systems such as
benefits, issues, technology interconnected operation, performance studies, planning and design. Several
authors have contributed to this book aiming to benefit students, researchers, academics, policy makers and
professionals. We are indebted to all the people who either directly or indirectly contributed towards the
publication of this book.
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